Israel's pre- and post-Oct. 7 northern border

(JNS) - When we discuss Israel's history, we often speak in terms of geography: the partition plan, the 1948 border, the pre-1967 armistice lines, the post-1967 borders and the post-1973 boundaries. Now, we must add the pre- and post-2023 borders. The major difference is that instead of expanding the size of the Jewish state, it has shrunk since Oct. 7 because of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's failure to protect northern Israel.

For roughly a decade, he avoided direct confrontation with Hamas, preferring to "mow the lawn" with periodic airstrikes that killed few terrorists and provided Israel with only temporary respites from rocket bombardment. The failure to defeat or deter Hamas led to the terrorist infiltration and terrorist attacks in southern Israel on Oct. 7.

Since that fateful day, Israel has faced an escalating threat from Hezbollah, which has launched rockets, drones and anti-tank missiles across the northern border. Hezbollah amassed a vast arsenal of 150,000 rockets, constructed an extensive tunnel network and entrenched itself within the civilian population of Lebanon on Netanyahu's watch. For 10 months, he has adopted the same failed strategy used in Gaza with tit-for-tat strikes that have killed about 400 terrorists out of an estimated 50,000 fighters (Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah claims 100,000), including 10,000 elite troops known as the Radwan Force.

The bombardment forced the evacuation of some 70,000 Israelis from their homes in the north within five kilometers of the border. Fortunately, except for the strike on Majdal Shams that killed 12 children, casualties have been low. But the damage to communities, agricultural land and infrastructure has been devastating.

Worse, Israelis' sense of security has been shattered, and the public has lost faith in the government's ability to protect them from a Hezbollah attack that could dwarf the horrors of Oct. 7.

Unless the Israel Defense Forces can drive Hezbollah out of Southern Lebanon (the notion that it will leave on its own through negotiations is folly), the de facto border of Israel has shifted, shrinking the country by approximately 250 square miles. This new reality may be remembered as the pre-Bibi and post-Bibi borders, marking Netanyahu as the first prime minister to cede sovereign Israeli territory to an enemy in war.

Israel would not be in this position if the United Nations had done its job. Most people have forgotten that Israeli troops first went into Lebanon in 1978 following a PLO terrorist attack and occupied most of Southern Lebanon. The U.N. Security Council called on Israel to withdraw, which it did, and created a peacekeeping force: the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

UNIFIL did nothing to keep the peace, and Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982 to root out the PLO. After doing so, a small 1,000-man Israeli force remained to protect towns and villages in northern Israel from attack. Meanwhile, Iran sent fighters to assist in the creation of a revolutionary Islamic movement in Lebanon-soon called Hezbollah, or "Party of God." As the Israeli presence in Lebanon lingered, Hezbollah drew support from those in the southern part of the country who wanted Israel to withdraw, and its organizational and military infrastructure developed with the help of Iran and Syria. Hezbollah attacks against the IDF eventually compelled Israel to evacuate the buffer zone in 2000.

With Israeli troops gone, Hezbollah filled the vacuum. UNIFIL failed to deter attacks against Israel or to prevent terrorists from establishing positions along Israel's border. The escalation of hostilities led to the Second Lebanon War in 2006. The Security Council unanimously approved Resolution 1701, which called for an end to the conflict through an immediate ceasefire, the withdrawal of all Israeli forces and the disarmament of Hezbollah. After a little more than a month of fighting, then-President George W. Bush pressured Prime Minister Ehud Olmert to end hostilities, assuring Israel that the United States would guarantee the implementation of resolution 1701.

In 2007, the Winograd Commission categorized the war as "a serious missed opportunity" that ended without clear military victory and highlighted significant flaws within the IDF. The commission noted that the IDF was unprepared for a full-scale ground invasion and that a lack of strategic thinking and planning led to the defense establishment's failure to defend the Israeli homeland successfully. Two years later, Netanyahu was elected. In between, Israel agreed to a prisoner exchange with Hezbollah.

The United States did nothing to fulfill its commitment to Israel after the war. Along with the rest of the world, Bush and his successors allowed Hezbollah to rebuild, obtain tens of thousands of missiles and other advanced weaponry from Iran and Syria, and deploy a terrorist army along the border with Israel. UNIFIL was no more than a bystander, completely failing in its mandate.

Except for the year of governments led by Yair Lapid and Naftali Bennett, Netanyahu has been in power since 2009. He was widely praised for keeping Israel out of war during this period. The Israeli consensus was that Hamas and Hezbollah could be contained and deterred. After all, even Hezbollah's leader, Hassan Nasrallah, had admitted after the destruction in Lebanon from the war that he made a mistake by provoking Israel. Moreover, Israelis feared going into Lebanon again would be too costly in soldiers' lives.

It is easier to justify inaction in Gaza since Hamas was not seen as a severe threat. However, Hezbollah posed a far more significant and growing danger. Netanyahu was focused on what he described as an existential threat from Iran; nevertheless, he failed to prevent Iran from reaching the threshold of becoming a nuclear power. Unlike Menachem Begin and Ehud Olmert, who ignored U.S. pressure and the inevitable international opprobrium to destroy the Iraqi and Syrian nuclear reactors, Netanyahu blustered without pulling the trigger, even when he had a clear justification after Iran launched its missile attack on Israel in April. He may get another chance if Iran follows through on its threat to retaliate for the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh.

Now, with Israel's northern border effectively redrawn, Netanyahu faces a stark choice: launch the invasion of Lebanon that he has long avoided or accept the loss of sovereignty in the north. It is hard to imagine any other way for the border to be restored and the residents to return to their homes. Washington will vigorously oppose Israel's action and may be induced to impose the arms embargo so many of his advisers want. The international demonization of Israel will grow and so will the campus protests. The media will skewer Israel as the civilian casualties inevitably mount. The wider war Biden has managed to avert (though it may erupt any moment) may be even more likely if Iran defends its proxy. Even if Israel goes into Lebanon, there is no assurance it will emerge victorious. The IDF hasn't won a war since 1967, and many Israelis still see the first Lebanon war as their Vietnam.

Time is running out for Israel. Netanyahu must decide whether Israel can accept the post-Oct. 7 reality. The choice might define Netanyahu's legacy and Israel's future.