Central Florida's Independent Jewish Voice

Consideration for a Two-State Solution - Part II

In parts II, III and IV, four prime ministers — David Ben Gurion, Yitzak Rabin, Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon — will be discussed.

David Ben Gurion 1948-54; 1955-63

Israel’s first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, was faced with the decision: Accepting a Jewish State on a portion of historical Palestine, relinquishing the balance to the Palestinian Arabs; or losing U.S. support for the UN’s declaration for creation of the new Jewish State. In lieu of that declaration, the UN would probably have established a Trusteeship over the entire Palestinian territory, therein denying Jewish exclusivity, upon the May 1948 termination of the British Mandate. In August 1946, in reference to the term “two-state solution,” Ben Gurion publicly affirmed: “It was in the spirit of compromise that we decided to accept Partition, which is the absolute limit to which a Jew and a Zionist can go. Partition is not the Zionist Program: the Zionist Program is a Jewish State in the whole of Palestine.” In a formal response on Aug. 9, U.S. President Truman agreed to “support independence based on such a principle.” Ben Gurion’s compromise cemented Truman’s support for creation of the new State. On Nov. 29, 1947, Ben Gurion accepted the map, outlining the State of Israel’s initial abbreviated boundaries … coupled by the Arab Leagues complete and unequivocal rejection.

The concept of a Jewish state, shared with the Palestinian Arab population, was not new for Ben Gurion. Early on he stated: “…the mission of Zionism” was not to dispossess Arabs but to “settle in those places where the present inhabitants of the land have not established themselves and are unable to do so.” Ben Gurion’s position was Jewish dominion over its sacred homeland and its entitlement of possession over the existing “residents.”

Interestingly, Ben Gurion empathized with the Arab’s perception of entitlement to the land and their desire to stay. What he did not initially perceive, however, was that the Arab inhabitants saw themselves as “Palestinian Nationals,” as opposed to members of a greater geopolitical community. In 1934 Ben Gurion entered discussions with Arab leadership to establish a new, pan-Arab community consisting of the future Israel, Jordan, and Iraq. Effectively, a new “Zionist Entity” would be created, and the Palestinians (within that geographic entity) would become part of the greater Arab community. The Palestinian population would be entitled to all the civil and human rights afforded to the Jews within the newly established Zionist Entity but would still be identified as citizens of the pan-Arab community. The discussions collapsed when Arab leadership demanded limitations to the number of Jewish settlers allowed into Israel. Under no circumstances would Ben Gurion accept restrictions to the Jewish “Right of Return.”

At a Jewish Agency meeting in 1935, Ben Gurion said: “… I do not believe it possible to deny all rights to the Arabs. We have no moral right to do that.” Subsequent reaffirmations in 1936 and 1937 speeches to the Histradrut emphasized “… the Arab inhabitants of Palestine should enjoy all civic and political rights … as a national group, just like the Jews.” However, it was the Arab Revolt of 1936-39 that moved Ben Gurion to acknowledging Palestinian nationalism, distinct from pan-Arabism, as a potential impact to formulation of the new State.

Great Britain adopted the Balfour Declaration in 1917, under the guidance of Chaim Weitzman, therein endorsing the entitlement to “ … a national home for the Jewish people … ” but also affirming “… that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious right of existing non-Jewish people.” However, it was Britian’s 1937 Pell Report, though never formally adopted, that more directly impacted the Zionist cause. The report was ordered to assess a British response to the Arab riots of 1936-39. It concluded that Arabs and Jews were culturally and historically incompatible and Palestine could not be democratically governed as a jointly formulated entity. The only option would be for Britain to consider Partitioning of the Mandate.

These conclusions challenged Ben Gurion’s “socialist” Zionism. The Balfour Declaration of 1917 was assumed to encompass the entirety of Palestine, which includes modern day Israel with an eastern boundary running along the Jordan River, Lake Kinneret, down thru the Dead Sea to the Gulf of Aqaba. However, the British subsequently affirmed two important “oversights.” First, was that the whole of Palestine was not necessarily intended for allocation to a Jewish homeland. Second, there had not been any consideration for the status of the existing Arab residents, either politically or geographically.

At the time of the Pell Report, Palestine had grown to over 400,000 Jews, who provided the economic substructure, blended with 1,000,000 Arabs, predominantly of the lower classes. Ben Gurion, as an affirmed European socialist, was challenged in the philosophy of blending of the masses for mutual benefit, coupled with the concept of an exclusively Jewish state. This conflict motivated his acquiescence to the 1946 decision to partition. Palestine must be subdivided into two states, one exclusively Jewish, and a second adjoining Arab state. Ben Gurion’s decision to compromise on his most basic Zionist belief, reinforced by the Pell Report, sanctioned the plan for partition by the UN General Assembly on November 29, 1947.

There are many examples of Ben Gurion’s stubbornness and inflexibility. However, history will remember him for his thoughtful confidence, courage, and vision in the compromise decisions that enabled the founding of the Jewish State of Israel on May 14, 1948.

In Part III, Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin’s commitment to establishing Israel’s supremacy of military might and security for the Jewish State will be discussed.

 
 

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